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Clement Attlee – the man who created the welfare state and decolonised vast
swathes of the British Empire – has been acclaimed by many as Britains’ greatest
twentieth-century Prime Minister. Yet somehow Attlee the man remains elusive and
little known. How did such a moderate, modest man bring about so many enduring
changes? What are the secrets of his leadership style? Guy Lodge finds out more.
Att lee: A Life in Polit ics. Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds. I.B. Tauris. 2012
Most governments t ry to make a dif ference to the course of
history, but only a very few succeed. In Britain since 1832, such
landmark governments include the war-t ime premierships of  Lloyd
George and Churchill and the peacet ime administrat ions of  Peel,
Gladstone (1868–74), Disraeli, Asquith, At t lee and Thatcher.
Of this elite club, the Att lee government of  1945–51 can claim to
be the most creat ive, and can perhaps boast the most enduring
historic legacy. In just  six years, the Att lee government built  the
welfare state, including the jewel in the crown of  its New Jerusalem
– the nat ional health service – replaced the failed laissez-faire
economic orthodoxy of  the 1930s with Keynesianism and a
programme of nat ionalisat ion, decolonised large swathes of  the
Brit ish empire, and commit ted Britain to the At lant icism that has def ined Brit ish foreign policy ever
since.
Such achievements are all the more remarkable when you consider that  austerity-era Britain was
bankrupted by war and immediately faced a new and dangerous enemy in the Soviet  Union.
Indeed, the Att lee government ’s t rue sign of  greatness is that  rather than succumbing to adverse
circumstances, it  capitalised on them. But self -evident ly it  was not an unalloyed triumph. In 1951,
Labour lost  and was consigned to the polit ical wilderness for 13 years, with the unity of  the Att lee
era giving way to the civil war that broke out between the Gaitskellites and Bevanites.
Nonetheless, to paraphrase Churchill, this was unquest ionably Labour’s f inest  hour. But how much
of this can be at t ributed to the leadership of  Clement Att lee himself? This is the quest ion at  the
heart  of  Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds excellent  biography Attlee: A Life in Politics, which was
published in paperback earlier this year. It  is an important quest ion to ask, since while Att lee’s
reputat ion has soared in recent years – he was voted the greatest  modern prime minister by a
group of  polit ical scient ists in 2004 – he remains, in the words, of  Vernon Bogdanor, “the enigma
of Brit ish 20th-century history”. Tellingly, we tend to speak almost exclusively about the Att lee
government and rarely about Att lee the prime minister – and less st ill about Att lee the polit ical
leader.
Att lee’s elusiveness was a def ining feature of  his career. Labour historian Kenneth Morgan has
argued that the label of  the ‘Unknown Prime Minister’, at tached posthumously to Andrew Bonar-
Law, is more appropriate for Att lee on the day of  Labour’s landslide, on account of  his low public
prof ile. Hence Thomas-Symonds’ fair comment that, while historians might disagree on the causes
behind Labour’s great electoral t riumph, in none of  the compet ing interpretat ions “is the victory
attributed even in part  to him”.
The Att lee that emerges in this illuminat ing study is neither the cult  f igure he has become, nor the
colourless polit ician he was derided for being throughout his life. There is scant evidence here to
support  Hugh Dalton’s charge that Att lee was a “lit t le mouse”. For a mouse, the laconic Att lee
could be ruthless when required: on one occasion, asked why he was dismissing one of  his
ministers, he stared back and said “you don’t  measure up to the job”. RAB But ler, who served with
him during the war-t ime coalit ion, said he had “a habit  of  bit ing people in the pants” if  they turned
up to cabinet meet ings poorly briefed. Nor could he conceal his profound disdain for Ramsay
MacDonald and the failure of  his Nat ional government to address soaring levels of  unemployment:
“the government” he said “took over one of  our misfortunes – the prime minister”.
Like Orwell, At t lee is best thought of  as a patriot ic socialist . Driven by a deep a sense of  duty he
immediately enlisted at  the outbreak of  the Great War, and witnessed the horrors of  that  conf lict
f irst  in Gallipoli and then in Mesopotamia. He had no truck with the pacif ism of MacDonald and
Lansbury, and as leader (with Bevin’s support) adroit ly and painstakingly moved Labour behind the
cause of  collect ive security and rearmament. Like Orwell, however, he believed that the war ef fort
was just if ied by more than the need to defeat Hit ler: to be truly worth the human sacrif ice, victory
demanded winning the peace too.
This, of  course, did not stop Orwell lament ing what he considered to be the t imidity of  At t lee’s
post-war programme. Notwithstanding this upset, the gap between the moderat ion Att lee
embodied and the socialist  ‘revolut ion’ Orwell prophesied should not be exaggerated. True, Orwell
became suspicious of  Att lee’s stat ism, but fundamentally both form part  of  the English socialist
t radit ion that was rooted in – and celebrated the innate decency of  – ordinary people. If  Orwell
discovered socialism on the road to Wigan pier, At t lee’s conversion happened at  the Stepney
boys’ club, where he observed up close the poverty that blighted the East End. Their socialism, like
that of  Tawney and Morris, was ethical, not  theoret ical. “The intelligentsia”, At t lee declared, in
words that could easily have come from Orwell, “can be trusted to take the wrong view on any
subject”.
In the present book, Thomas-Symonds shows how Att lee was able to get to and then stay at  the
top of  Brit ish polit ics for as long as he did – his 20-year leadership was the longest of  any polit ical
party in the 20th century – through a combinat ion of  real ability and some remarkable luck. These
two factors obviously feed of f  and reinforce each other, but  fortune undoubtedly played a pivotal
role in Att lee’s polit ical life.
Had he, like most other ministers f rom the 1929–31 government, lost  his seat in Labour’s
catastrophic defeat of  1931, when it  was reduced to a rump of just  51 MPs, Thomas-Symonds
says Att lee’s star would have shone much less bright ly. The 1931 result  not  only had the ef fect  of
catapult ing Att lee f rom relat ive obscurity to the senior ranks of  the party, paving the way for his
leadership bid in 1935, but also ensured that in the 1935 contest  few believed they were being
asked to elect  a potent ial Labour prime minister. Instead, the author argues, the party was being
asked to choose a caretaker f igure to lead the party through to the next elect ion, which he right ly
contends Labour would have lost , precipitat ing Att lee’s demise. Had war not intervened to
postpone an elect ion in 1940 (or earlier) there would have been no Att lee premiership.
Above all At t lee was lucky that his two main rivals for the leadership – Ernest Bevin and Herbert
Morrison – were bit ter enemies who preferred to serve under him than each other. Had this not
been the case, it  is unlikely that Att lee would have ever entered Downing Street.
There is another important respect in which it  might be said Att lee got lucky, which Thomas-
Symonds does not touch on. There were structural factors in place that meant it  was
comparat ively easier for Att lee and his ministers to achieve the polit ical t ransformat ion they did.
The foundat ions of  the welfare state had been laid by Asquith’s government, which faced much
greater resistance from the forces of  react ion than did Att lee in 1945. The Brit ish Medical
Associat ion (BMA) was nothing compared to the ferocious opposit ion provided by Unionist
polit icians, the House of  Lords, the City and even the King himself  during 1909–11. Thomas-
Symonds fails to acknowledge the debt post-war Labour owed to the pre-war Edwardian lef t ,
which in vital respects helped to remove the ideological and inst itut ional barriers to progressive
reform.
Nor does he suff icient ly acknowledge the extent to which the planned economy that emerged
during the war and the important social reform achieved by the wart ime coalit ion, especially the
ideas encapsulated in the Beveridge report , meant that  Att lee was tapping into the prevailing
zeitgeist . These factors, combined with an idealism generated under wart ime condit ions, the
presence of  a largely homogenous manual work class, and a responsible t rade union movement,
all increased the wave that Att lee was able to ride. None of  this meant the accomplishments of  his
government were inevitable – there were signif icant cont ingent factors he had to contend with,
not least  the desperate state of  the nat ion’s f inances – but they nevertheless ensured the
potent ial for a last ing legacy.
Att lee subscribed to Bagehot ’s view that democracy was ‘government by discussion’ and believed
that the role of  the prime minister was to steer such discussion to a f irm conclusion. “The essent ial
qualit ies of  the PM,” wrote Att lee, “is that  he should be a good chairman able to get others to
work”. He might have added and “keep warring ministers apart”, since Att lee demonstrated
remarkable skill not  only in gett ing the most out of  the polit ical giants that sat  round his cabinet
table – it  was, af ter Asquith’s cabinet, the second most able in Brit ish history – but also, unt il the
tail-end of  his leadership at  least , in holding his famously f issiparous party together. At t lee
achieved the unity that  has eluded all other Labour leaders precisely because he did not worry
about being outshone by the likes of  Bevin, Morrison, Cripps and Dalton. “The secret  of  At t lee’s
success,” observed Jim Callaghan, “is that  he never pretended to be anything other than himself ”.
However, as Thomas-Symonds shows, Att lee’s personal style and hands-of f  approach to the
premiership was a double-edged sword, responsible for both the triumphs and failures of  his
government. His careful management of  Bevan throughout his f raught negot iat ions with the BMA
was crit ical to the successful launch of  the NHS. But Att lee’s failure to provide suff icient  leadership
during the coal shortage crisis in the winter of  1947 and the convert ibility crisis of  that  same year,
increasing the burden of  rat ioning on the public, badly damaged his government ’s reputat ion. It
also nearly cost  him his own job, had Cripps’ plot  to bring him down not been thwarted by Bevin.
“There was no leadership, no grip, no decision,” complained Cripps, underlining the fact  that  even in
the late 1940s prime ministers needed to be seen to lead from the front and not just  to delegate
responsibility to cabinet ministers.
It  is also quest ionable whether Bevin was right  that  Att lee’s quiet  public persona and reserved
character suited this period – he believed the public were t ired of  the pugnacious style of  the
MacDonalds and Churchills of  Britain’s recent past – since he was plagued with quest ions about
his leadership for the whole t ime he was in charge of  the party. He faced three leadership coups,
including one on the day of  Labour’s victory in 1945, when Morrison moved against  him in an act
which hardly represented a vote of  conf idence in the new prime minister. Harold Nicholson, the
diplomat, best summed up Att lee’s principal weakness when he described him as “a delight ful man
… but not a pilot  in a hurricane”.
And so it  proved, especially af ter the debacle of  1947, when faltering leadership combined with
poor health to deprive the government of  its init ial cohesion. When Bevan and Gaitskell squared up
to each other over how to cover the cost of  rearmament in 1951, Att lee could no longer work his
magic, and conspicuously failed to stand up to Gaitskell’s intransigence, forcing Bevan’s
resignat ion.
Historic counterfactuals are an overused device, but nevertheless two seem part icularly relevant in
the case of  Att lee’s leadership. The f irst  is to ask how successful his government would have been
had he not been blessed with such polit ical heavyweights as Morrison and Bevin. It  is dif f icult  to
resist  concluding that, without such f igures, Att lee and his premiership would have struggled to
achieve the landmark status it  did. But equally, what would have been the fate of  the government
had Att lee himself  not  been at  the helm? This second counterfactual underlines the centrality of
his leadership to the success of  his government, since a Morrison or Bevin premiership would in all
likelihood have descended into internecine warfare that has been the trademark of  previous and
subsequent Labour governments.
Ult imately, At t lee’s real failing – and something Thomas-Symonds overlooks – is that  while he was
the right  man to implement Labour’s 1945 manifesto, he lacked the necessary at t ributes to
spearhead a renewal of  Labour’s agenda once the main planks of  that  programme had been put in
place. This explains why his government soon ran out of  steam and why Morrison had to concede
at the 1949 party conference that whereas “there was 40 years of  thought” behind Labour’s 1945
manifesto, establishing a f resh programme ‘is not quite so simple as the task was’ then.
Contrary to the popular idea that the Att lee government marked the dawn of  a new era, it  was
understood at  the t ime, especially by those involved, to represent the end of  an old one. As
Kenneth Morgan has argued, this cabinet of  veterans regarded themselves as being present ‘at  a
climacteric of  history’, able to f inally realise the dreams of  the party’s early pioneers. Labour lost  –
and Att lee has to take the lion’s share of  responsibility for this – because the party had by 1951
proved incapable of  recovering its sense of  purpose.
—————————————————————————
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